Is GENRESTORE Confusable with RESTOREGEN?

September 15th, 2021

In a 2021 nonprecedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the refusal to register the mark GENRESTORE for dietary supplements and under §2(d) found it likely to cause confusion with the mark RESTOREGEN for dietary supplements, as well.

The Board began its analysis of the marks starting with the second and third DuPont factors, which look at the goods under the marks, the channels of trade and the classes of consumers. For the second factor, both GENRESTORE and RESTOREGEN cited “dietary supplements” as the goods. So, that factor weighed heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. Further, the Board found that since the listed goods were identical, the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to find a likelihood of confusion was lesser. In re Viterra, 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908(Fed. Cir. 2012). In regard to the third factor, the Board presumed that the trade channels and consumer classes would be similar, given that the listed goods were identical. Therefore, those factors weighed in favor of finding confusion likely. See In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 159 USPQ 721, 723 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally identical goods, the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same).

The Board then turned its attention to the first DuPont factor, which examines the similarity of the marks in their entireties as to their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. It started the analysis by looking at the terms within each mark. First, the applied-for mark, GENRESTORE, combined GEN and RESTORE with no space in between, while the registered mark, RESTOREGEN, combined the same terms in the reverse order, still with no space between. The Board found that the similarities in the wording outweighed the differences. Moreover, it stated that that the terms GEN and RESTORE look and sound identical, regardless of the order reversal. It also found that the marks conveyed the same meaning when used in connection with identical goods, which in this case were dietary supplements. The Board stated, “While Applicant’s mark presents the terms in Registrant’s mark in reverse order, this difference is not sufficient to overcome the confusion which would arise out of Applicant and Registrant using identical terms for identical goods.” The Applicant attempted to argue that the marks conveyed “distinctively different commercial impressions” since the registered mark “refers to restoring (restore) a genetic (gen) response,” while the applied-for mark while “refers to generation (gen) and restore.” The Board did not deny some merit in the argument, but found the merit baseless, as the Applicant provided no supporting evidence. Further, the Applicant ultimately conceded that the overall commercial impression of both marks implied the listed goods offered under the marks would both “restore” something missing in the user’s body or diet. Thus, the Board found that the marks created similar commercial impressions.

On a final note in reference to the first DuPont factor, the Board stated that it must be kept in mind that (1) “the fallibility of memory over a period of time;” (2) that the “average” purchaser “normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks;” and (3) that Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are comprised of the same terms and used in connection with identical goods.” See Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975). Therefore, the first factor weighed heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

Finally, the Board looked at the fourth DuPont factor, which looks at the consumers’ sophistication and the degree of care used in the purchase. It found that this factor weighed against a finding of a likelihood of confusion, as the target consumers were more likely to exercise a certain degree of care, as the listed goods were dietary supplements. Ultimately, the Board concluded that this factor was outweighed by the other relevant DuPont factors and affirmed the §2(d) refusal to register the applied-for mark GENRESTORE.

Is FAST DRINK Merely Descriptive?

September 15th, 2021

In a 2021 nonprecedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board reversed the §2(e)(1) refusal to register the mark FAST DRINK for “Nutritional meal replacement drinks adapted for medical use; herbal teas for medical treatments,” and found that the mark was not merely descriptive of its cited goods.

To begin, a mark is merely descriptive if it “consist[s] merely of words descriptive of the qualities, ingredients or characteristics of the goods or services related to the mark.” In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, when a mark consists of multiple terms, it does not automatically create a nondescriptive word or phrase. In re Associated Theater Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (TTAB 1988). If each term retains its merely descriptive significance, in relation to the cited goods or services, the combination of the terms results in a mark that is still overall merely descriptive. Oppedahl, 71 USPQ2d at 1371. However, a mark that is comprised of merely descriptive components, which ultimately create a nondescriptive meaning, or a meaning insignificant to the cited goods or services, the mark may still be registrable. Further, a mark may be considered suggestive, as opposed to merely descriptive, if when encountered with the cited goods, requires a certain degree of reasoning, imagination, thought or perception in order to determine the attributes of the cited goods. See, e.g., In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978).

The Examining Attorney argued that the mark FAST DRINK was merely descriptive of a significant feature of the cited goods, specifically that the goods were “for use during periods when a consumer either completely abstains from food, instead consuming herbal teas or meal replacement drinks such as those described in applicant’s application or when a consumer greatly reduces the food for a certain period, instead consuming herbal teas or meal replacement drinks.” The Examining Attorney used dictionary definitions of the terms “fast” and “drink” to support the argument and pointed specifically to the following definitions: fast – “[t]he act or practice of abstaining from or eating very little food” and “drink” – “liquid suitable for swallowing especially to quench thirst or to provide nourishment or refreshment.”

The Board agreed that the terms retained their individual meaning, but it maintained that there was a lack of evidence to support that the term FAST DRINK, as a unitary mark, referred to a drink that was “consumed during, or in preparation for, a fast.” However, the Board stated that even if consumers were to perceive the mark in that manner, there were other ways to perceive it as well, given that the term “fast” is also defined as “acting, moving, or capable of acting or moving quickly; swift,” and “accomplished in relatively little time.” Because of these other viable definitions, the Board believed that consumers could also perceive FAST DRINK as a product that could be quickly prepared, used as quick snack or an on-the-go meal replacement, which could be used during fasting. The Board noted that precedent ruled that “marks which create a double entendre or double meaning are not merely descriptive.” See., e.g., In re Tea and Sympathy Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1062, 1064 (TTAB 2008).

Ultimately, the Board stated that since it found FAST DRINK equally as likely to be perceived as indicating a drink that could be used while fasting, a drink that could be made quickly or a drink that could be consumed quickly or as an on-the-go meal replacement, the mark was “at most, suggestive of the identified goods.” As such, the Board concluded that the mark FAST DRINK was a double entendre in connection with the listed goods and reversed the §2(e)(1) refusal to register.

Is KING’S RANSOM for Scotch Confusable with KING’S RANSOM for Wine?

August 22nd, 2021

In a 2021 nonprecedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board reversed the refusal to register the mark KING’S RANSOM for “spirits, namely, aged luxury Scotch whisky for private sale only by invitation,” and found it not likely to cause confusion under §2(d) with KING’S RANSOM for “wines.”

In examining marks for likelihood of confusion, all relevant DuPont factors must be considered. Further, there are two key considerations, which must be accounted for: the similarities between the marks, and the relatedness of the goods. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945 (Fed. Cir. 2004). With this in mind, the Board conducted its analysis of the marks: KING’S RANSOM for “spirits, namely, aged luxury Scotch whisky for private sale only by invitation,” and KING’S RANSOM for “wines.”

Briefly turning to the first DuPont factor, which looks at the similarities of the marks in their entireties, the Board found that this factor weighed heavily in favor of likelihood of confusion, as the marks were identical in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. See DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.

The Board then looked at the second and third DuPont factors, which relate to the goods, trade channels and classes of consumers. “[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the respective products are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.’” Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In analyzing the second and third factors, the Board referred to the goods listed in both the application and the cited registration, and the identifications of the respective goods listed, as well. In citing In re i.am.symbolic llc, 866 USPQ2d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983) the Board stated that in its analysis of the third factor, it must “assume that the identified goods move through all normal and usual channels of trade and methods of distribution for such goods and services.”

The Applicant argued that even though the marks were identical, the goods did not travel in the same trade channels and did not have the same consumer classes. It explained that its whiskey was not ordinary whiskey and the examining attorney “erred by dismissing the importance of the nature of the unique scotch [sic] whisky at issue, its typical consumer, channels of travel, marketing, and the restricted nature of the sale and the buying process.” It then introduced evidence of high-end whiskey, which sold for high prices ranging from $10,195 to $460,000 a bottle. Finally, the Applicant emphasized that its restricted identification set its whiskey apart from ordinary retail channels of trade for whiskey, and its exclusivity weighed heavily against finding confusion likely.

Considering the Applicant’s argument, the Board first found that none of the submitted evidence showed the same mark for both whiskey and wine, which meant there was no persuasive evidence to suggest that consumers would encounter the aforementioned goods under the same mark, from the same source. The Board cited Contrast In re Detroit Ath. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018), which credited relatedness evidence that third parties use the same mark for the goods and services at issue because “[t]his evidence suggests that consumers are accustomed to seeing a single mark associated with a source that sells both.” Looking next at submitted evidence of online retail stores, which sold both whiskey and wine under various marks, the Board stated that it did not establish “relatedness or common trade channels for wine and whiskey ‘for private sale only by invitation.’” It found that given the exclusivity of the Applicant’s whiskey, it would not be found on a generally available internet-retail site. Turning to other third-party registrations pertaining to wine and whiskey, the Board found that some of the registrations “suggest[ed] that [wine and whiskey] are of a type which may emanate from a single source,” See In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1998). However, it found the third-party registrations insufficient to establish relatedness of “wines” to the Applicant’s “aged luxury Scotch whisky for private sale only by invitation.” Ultimately, the Board found that the second and third DuPont factors weighed against a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Finally, the Board studied the fourth DuPont factor, which deals with the sophistication of the purchaser. Given the high-end nature of the Applicant’s listed goods, the Board found that the goods “would involve relatively careful purchasing conditions and more sophisticated purchasers.” See Elec. Design & Sales Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 21 USPQ2d 1388, 1392, “Just from the record description of goods and services here one would expect that nearly all of opposer’s and applicant’s purchasers would be highly sophisticated.” Therefore, the Board found that the fourth factor weighed against a finding of likelihood of confusion.

In conclusion, the Board decided that the Applicant’s mark was not likely to cause confusion with the mark in the cited registration, and the satisfaction of the first DuPont factor was outweighed by the other relevant factors. So, the Board reversed the §2(d) refusal to register the mark KING’S RANSOM for “aged luxury Scotch whisky for private sale only by invitation.”

Disclaim ‘Bark’ in Big Bar? Or Unitary Mark?

August 22nd, 2021

In a 2021 nonprecedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board reversed the refusal to register the mark BIG BARK for “tree care services,” unless the term BARK was disclaimed.

Under §1056(a), an examining attorney may require an applicant to disclaim a component of an otherwise registrable mark. In the case at hand, the Applicant was required to disclaim the term BARK, as it is a merely descriptive term, and therefore unregistrable under §2(e)(1). The Applicant agreed that BARK was a merely descriptive term but argued that it did not require a disclaimer as it was part of the unitary mark, BIG BARK. “If the matter that comprises the mark or relevant portion of the mark is unitary, no disclaimer of an element, whether descriptive, generic or otherwise, is required.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures §1213.05 (2018).

So, the Board conducted the following analysis to determine whether or not the applied-for mark, BIG BARK, was a unitary mark. In Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 21 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Federal Circuit stated that a unitary mark is made up of inseparable elements, and it must create a “single and distinct commercial impression.” Further, the Fed. Circuit explained that the test to determine a mark’s “unitariness” required the Board to determine “how the average purchaser would encounter the mark under normal marketing of such goods and also…what the reaction of the average purchaser would be to this display of the mark.” Using the Applicant’s specimen of use, the Board began its examination of the mark.  Starting with each separate term, it found that BIG was the modifying adjective for BARK, and that used together, the applied-for mark BIG BARK had no well-known meaning in connection with trees, or tree care services. Therefore, the Board found that the mark BIG BARK had a distinct meaning, independent of its individual components, and gave a commercial impression separate from the term BARK, alone. Turning to the commercial impression of the applied-for mark, the Board found it likely that clients, and potential clients, would refer to the Applicant’s services as BIG BARK tree services, opposed to either “Big” tree services or “Bark” tree services. As such, the Board found that the applied-for mark BIG BARK had a “suggestive significance wholly distinct from the merely descriptive significance of the term ‘BARK.’” It found that consumers would not go through the mental process of breaking apart the two terms but would see the applied-for mark as a unitary term. Further, the Board found that the alliteration of the two first letters would reinforce the likelihood that consumers were likely to see the term as a composite and not rely on one term or the other as the dominant portion of the mark.

In conclusion, the Board found that the applied-for mark BIG BARK was a unitary mark, and an incongruous term “because the combination of ‘BIG’ and ‘BARK’ is illogical, out of place, or unexpected.” So, the Board reversed the §1056(a) registration refusal and found that the Applicant was indeed able to register the mark without disclaiming the term “bark,” as it was a component of a unitary mark.

Likelihood of Confusion Case – TRUST THE PROCESS

June 27th, 2021

In a 2021 precedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed a §2(d) refusal to register for the mark TRUST THE PROCESS for shoes and found it likely to cause confusion with the identical mark for shirts and sweatshirts.

The Board began its analysis of the marks starting with the first DuPont factor: the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018).

The Applicant, Joel Embiid, conceded that the marks were identical in appearance and sound but argued that confusion would be unlikely because his mark identifies him, and the Registrant’s, Marcus Lemonis, mark identifies him. He further reasoned that his mark would have a distinct connotation because he is a “famous NBA player, who’s known for his tagline ‘TRUST THE PROCESS’ and his nickname ‘THE PROCESS.’” Because of this, the Applicant argued that his mark would be synonymous with him and that his mark conveyed a commercial impression and connotation of “overcoming difficulties through perseverance and fortitude,” which was based on his own character. Finally, the Applicant argued that the marks were different since the Registrant’s goods (shirts and sweatshirts) were promotional items that supported the Registrant’s business advice and TV show, which had no connection to basketball or the Applicant. In citing In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2 USPQ2d 1312 (TTAB 1987) & In re British Bulldog, Ltd., 224 USPQ 854 (TTAB 1984); and In re Sydel Lingerie Co., 197 USPQ 629 (TTAB 1977)) the Applicant stated the marks differ in meaning because they “create sufficiently different commercial impressions when applied to the respective parties’ goods or services such that there is no possibility for confusion despite overlaps in the marks.”

After reviewing the evidence submitted, the Board found that even if both parties were known in their different professions as TRUST THE PROCESS, the evidence was insufficient to show that consumers would associate the mark TRUST THE PROCESS solely with the Applicant or Registrant for their respective goods or that they would be able to differentiate the source of the goods sold under the two marks based on their respective owners. Further, the Board found that there was no reason to assume that the mark TRUST THE PROCESS would have one meaning in connection with the Applicant’s goods (shoes) and a different or secondary meaning in connection with the Registrant’s goods (shirts and sweatshirts) given their similar nature. In that fashion, the Board found the marks to be identical in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, and stated, “The first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion.” i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1748 (quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The Board then moved onto the second DuPont factor, which pertains to the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and examined the relatedness of the goods at hand. “[B]ecause the marks are identical, the degree of similarity between the goods . . . required for confusion to be likely declines.” DeVivo v. Ortiz, 2020 USPQ2d 10153, at *11 (TTAB 2020). The Applicant first argued that the “goods are not even complementary or companion items that would be sold together.” Second, he argued that given both his fame and the Registrant’s fame, it would not be likely for consumers to purchase their respective goods without being aware of the source. “Therefore, consumers will be very familiar with the source of the goods prior to purchase, as they are buying the goods to show their support [of] Marcus Lemonis or Joel Embiid as the source of the respective goods, ensuring confusion will not result.”  The Board stated “we must presume that Applicant’s “shoes” and Registrant’s “shirts and sweat shirts” include “all goods of the type identified, without limitation as to their nature or price,” Sock It to Me, 2020 USPQ2d 10611, at *8. This presumption was made since neither the Applicant’s nor Registrant’s registration identified any limitations regarding the nature of the identified goods, their trade channels or consumer classes. The Board went on to say that if the parties had tailored their applications, it would have made a significant difference in the analysis. So, because of this, the Board found that “those ubiquitous, everyday products ‘are offered to all the normal potential consumers for those goods, which would include not only’ Applicant’s fans and fans of Registrant’s television show, ‘but all members of the general public.’” New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, 2020 USPQ2d 10596, at *16 (TTAB 2020). In conclusion, the Board stated, “The record as a whole is more than sufficient to convince us that ‘shoes,’ and ‘shirts and sweat shirts,’ are related, particularly given the reduced degree of similarity between the goods that is necessary for confusion to be likely arising from the fact that they are sold under identical marks,” and found that the second DuPont factor weighed in favor of finding confusion likely.

Finally, the Board turned its attention to the third DuPont factor, which looks at the channels of trade and classes of consumers. It found that given the nature of the goods, which were “marketed to the general population,” they were considered general consumer goods. Moreover, the record showed that both shoes and shirts were sold together on clothing websites and have been registered under a single mark by multiple apparel businesses. So, the Board found that both elements “plainly overlap[ped],” and found that the third DuPont factor supported a finding of likelihood of confusion.

In conclusion, the Board affirmed the §2(d) refusal to register based on the first three DuPont factors. It stated that based on the record as a whole, the Applicant’s mark TRUST THE PROCESS so resembled the Registrant’s mark TRUST THE PROCESS that when used in connection with their respective identified goods it would be likely for the marks to “cause confusion, to cause mistake or to deceive.”

When A Mark Consists of Both Words and Designs

June 27th, 2021

When an Examining Attorney is examining a mark for registration, he must determine whether likelihood of confusion may exist between it, and an already-registered mark. Under §2(d), when analyzing marks for determining likelihood of confusion, that marks must be compared in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Further, during the analysis, the marks must be considered in their entirety and not examined piecemeal. “The commercial impression of a trademark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, if one feature of the mark is more prominent, it will be given greater significance for the purpose of finding likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. See, e.g.In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Often, when a mark consists of both words and a design, more significance is given to the words because that is the aspect of the mark that purchasers are likely to remember, refer to or use when requesting goods or services. See In re Viterra, 671 F3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Though the wording is commonly the dominant portion of a mark, there are certain instances where the design aspect of a mark is the more prominent portion, and it should be given greater significance. See Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung, 797 F.3d at 1372, 116 USPQ2d at 1135. This may be the case if the if the mark contains “unusual or uncommon design features,” or if the design element is the “most visually prominent” aspect. See In Re Primeway Intl. LLC, 87059786, 2019 WL 646088 (2019). In Primeway, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board examined whether the Applicant’s mark, INCOGNITO, and Registrant’s STS “INCOGNITO” and design mark were confusingly similar. The Applicant’s mark was comprised of a wolf in sheep’s clothing with an arm extended out against the large letters “STS.” The word “incognito” appeared under the design in small letters, and so, the Board held that the most prominent feature of the mark was the design and the letters “STS,” not the shared term “incognito.” It then reversed the refusal to register under 2(d).

 In other words, the word portion of a mark is typically given greater significance because it is the portion that stands out for consumers, yet the design portion may be more dominant if it is the portion that is more likely to stand out to consumers.

 

Merely Descriptive/ Disclaimer Requirement – DANK TANK

May 11th, 2021

In a 2021 non-precedential decision, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed a disclaimer requirement for the term DANK in the proposed mark DANK TANK for “Ale; Beer.” The Board found the term to be merely descriptive of the applicant’s goods, and therefore without the disclaimer, the proposed mark was unregistrable under §2(e)(1) and §6(a) of the Trademark Act.

Under §2(e)(1), the determination of descriptiveness of an Applicant’s mark, or portion of one, is based on three elements: (1) The relation of the term to the Applicant’s goods or services, (2) The context in which the mark is being used and (3) the possible significance the mark would have to the average purchaser because of the manner of its use or intended use, not in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork. See In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012). If the term is found to be merely descriptive of an Applicant’s goods or services, it is considered to be an unregistrable component of the mark and must be disclaimed.

The Applicant attempted three arguments: First, the Applicant argued that neither the term DANK nor the unitary mark DANK TANK conveyed an immediate idea of the characteristics of the goods, but rather was suggestive of “a beer or ale product that does not include cannabis.” The Applicant reasoned that “customers must apply multiple mental steps, first associating the term ‘tank’ with a beverage and then associating the unitary mark ‘DANK TANK’ with a particular beverage (beer, ale) that does not include cannabis, demonstrates the suggestiveness of the mark.” Second, the Applicant argued that DANK TANK was a unitary mark for the goods at issue and therefore, it should not be dissected in order to require a disclaimer for the term DANK. In its third and final argument, the Applicant maintained that the proposed mark DANK TANK was a double entendre, because “the term ‘dank’ is used by some to refer to cannabis.”

Starting with the Applicant’s first argument, the Board turned to the definition of the term “dank” submitted by the Examining Attorney, and a third-party usage of the term, which was in line with the submitted definition. As defined on UrbanDictionary.com, the term “dank” “means or refers to ‘…sticky, juicy, very pungent and of a high level’ and ‘[v]ery hoppy, cloudy IPAs with high alcohol content and flavors with a very funky taste.’” Further, the Examining Attorney submitted an article from the Washington Post website that said, “…you see, cannabis and hops are relatives, and both get their flavors and aromas from compounds called terpenes. That’s why brewers like to describe super-hoppy IPAs the way that they might talk about marijuana: ‘dank,’ ‘resinous,’ ‘sticky.’” Regarding the submitted definition, the Board stated that simply because no traditional dictionary contained a definition for the term “dank,” it did not mean that the term was not merely descriptive. See In re Thomas Collators, Inc., 158 USPQ 297, 298 (TTAB 1968). Ultimately, in terms of the Applicant’s first argument, the Board concluded that the term was indeed merely descriptive of the listed goods.

Turning the Applicant’s second argument, which held that DANK TANK was a unitary mark, the Board maintained that “A mark is considered unitary when it creates a single and distinct commercial impression separate and apart from the meaning of its constituent elements.” See Dena v. Belvedere, 21 USPQ2d at 1052. Further, “If the matter that comprises the mark or relevant portion of the mark is unitary, no disclaimer of an element, whether descriptive, generic, or otherwise, is required.” See In re EBS Data Processing, 212 USPQ 964, 966 (TTAB 1981). When looking at the Applicant’s proposed mark DANK TANK, the Board found that prospective purchasers who viewed the proposed mark would know that DANK was descriptive of the listed goods, and TANK was defined as “a usually large receptacle for holding, transporting, or storing liquids (such as water or fuel).” So, they would easily find that the proposed mark was comprised of two separate terms. Therefore, the Board concluded that the proposed mark DANK TANK was not a unitary mark and could indeed be dissected for the purpose of a required disclaimer.

Finally, the Board briefly looked at the Applicant’s last argument that the proposed mark was a double entendre. As stated in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), “For trademark purposes, a ‘double entendre’ is an expression that has a double connotation or significance as applied to the goods or services. … The multiple interpretations that make an expression a ‘double entendre’ must be associations that the public would make fairly readily.” The Applicant’s argument that the term “dank” was occasionally used to refer to cannabis was not strong enough for the Board to find a double entendre. It found that when the term “dank” was combined with “tank,” it maintained its descriptive significance in relation to the Applicant’s listed goods. So, the Board stated, “Therefore, “DANK” would be perceived by purchasers of Applicant’s ale and beer as signifying a quality, feature or characteristic of those goods resulting in no unitary meaning or double entendre imparted by DANK TANK.”

In conclusion, the Board found that the proposed mark DANK TANK was merely descriptive of the Applicant’s listed goods, it did not create a unitary mark and it did not form a double entendre, therefore, the Board affirmed the disclaimer requirement of the term “dank” under §2(e)(1) and §6(a) of the Trademark Act.

Deceptively Misdescriptive Case – CLEAR

May 6th, 2021

In a 2021 precedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed two §2(e)(1) registration refusals for the mark CLEAR finding it deceptively misdescriptive for footwear, lingerie, and other clothing items, and for handbags, purses, wallets and related items, all “excluding transparent goods.”

Under §2(e)(1) a mark is considered deceptively misdescriptive if: (1) The mark misdescribes a quality, feature, function or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used, and (2) consumers would be likely to believe the misrepresentation. “[T]he reasonably prudent consumer test is applied in assessing whether consumers are likely to believe the misrepresentation.” See In re Hinton, 116 USPQ2d at 1052 (citing R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 226 USPQ 169, 179 (TTAB 1985)).

The Board began its analysis of the proposed mark by determining whether or not the mark was misdescriptive of the goods with which it was used. After reviewing the evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney, which included the dictionary definition of the term “clear” and third-party website submissions, it considered Applicant’s argument that “it is only seeking to register it for non-transparent footwear.” (Emphasis added.) Further, the Applicant argued that its proposed mark did not describe a plausible feature of its goods because the goods recited in the application did not include transparent clothing, footwear or accessories. However, the Board found that argument ineffective and stated, “We cannot assume that consumers of Applicant’s goods will be aware that its identification is so restricted, and the restriction is not controlling of public perception.” See In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1187-88 (TTAB 2018).  The Board was similarly unpersuaded by Applicant’s argument that the term “clear” had other meanings when used in connection with its goods.  Accordingly, the Board found the first prong of the test was satisfied and concluded that the Applicant “cannot avoid a finding of deceptive misdescriptiveness by excluding from its identification the very characteristic that its mark is misdescribing.” Cf. In re ALP of South Beach, Inc., 79 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (TTAB 2006).

The Board then considered the second prong of the test: whether or not consumers were likely to believe the misrepresentation. The evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney showed that Applicant’s goods could indeed be transparent, “clear” or include “clear” elements. Moreover, the record indicated that “clear shoes were one of the big breakout trends on the spring/summer runways.” The Board found that as a result of the evidence submitted, consumers would likely believe that the items under the proposed mark CLEAR were clear or transparent even when they were not. The Applicant contended that consumers were unlikely to believe the misrepresentation because they would be “visually inspecting” the items prior to the purchase. This argument did not sway the Board and it found that just because consumers would understand that the goods were not made of, and/or did not contain, clear or transparent elements it did not negate their understanding of the misdescription prior to visual inspection. The Board stated, “If Applicant’s goods were to be promoted by word-of-mouth or on social media or in print (e.g., in fashion blogs, magazine articles, or even Applicant’s future advertising) without an image of the goods, a reasonable consumer seeking what the record shows to be a fashion trend would believe that Applicant’s goods, promoted under the proposed CLEAR mark, would feature transparent or clear attributes.” See, e.g., In re Woodward & Lothrop Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1412, 1414 (TTAB 1987). So, the Board found that the second prong of the test was satisfied.

In conclusion, the Board found that both prongs of the deceptively misdescriptive test were satisfied, and therefore affirmed both of the §2(e)(1) refusals of registration for the Applicant’s proposed mark CLEAR.

Is BARSKI Primarily Merely a Surname?

April 30th, 2021

In a 2021 non-precedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board reversed the §2(e)(4) refusal to register the mark BARSKI for or beverage glassware, pitchers, ice buckets and various other items in Class 21 and found that the mark was not primarily merely a surname.

Under §2(e)(4)  a term is primarily merely a surname “if, when viewed in relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought, its primary significance to the purchasing public is that of a surname.” See Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017). If the mark is primarily merely a surname, and absent acquired distinctiveness, it cannot be registered on the Principal Register. When determining whether or not a term is primarily merely a surname there is no specific rule or  amount of evidence necessary to show that the mark would be perceived as primarily merely a surname – the Board must base its decision on the facts at hand in each case. See In re Pohang Iron & Steel Co., 230 USPQ 79, 79 (TTAB 1986). Though there is no test, there are certain circumstances that are taken into consideration when examining the mark to decide if the public would perceive the mark as primarily merely a surname. Following are the circumstances applicable in the case at hand: (1) The frequency and extent of public exposure to the term as a surname, (2) Whether the term is the surname of anyone connected with Applicant, (3) Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname (4) And whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname. See Darty, 225 USPQ at 653-54; In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 n.4 (TTAB 2016).

The Board began its examination of the proposed mark BARSKI by first determining whether or not the term was indeed a surname. It found that though the BARSKI was not associated with the Applicant, the evidence of record showed that multiple people in the United States did have the surname BARSKI. Moreover, the name, which is of Polish origin, had no “ordinary language meaning,” and “ surnames of Polish origin often end with the letters ‘SKI.’”

The Applicant argued that the proposed mark BARSKI is not primarily merely a surname, and the public would perceive it as a fanciful term. The Board dismissed the Applicant’s evidence from UrbanDictionary.com that showed multiple definitions for the terms “BARSKY” and “BARSKIES,” as neither of which were the actual proposed mark BARSKI. The Applicant then argued that BARSKI was a coined term that was a combination of the Applicant’s founders’ names (“BaumgARten and ZablotSKY [pronounced ‘ski’]”). However, the Board stated, “Applicant’s argument concerning the origin of ‘Barski’ as a combination of Applicant’s founders’ surnames, neither of which includes the three-letter strings ‘bar’ or ‘ski,’ is unconvincing.”

Finally, the Board turned back to the question at hand: When applied to Applicant’s goods, would the purchasing public be more likely to perceive the mark BARSKI, in standard characters, as a surname rather than as anything else? “[I]t is that impact or impression which should be evaluated in determining whether or not the primary significance of a word when applied to a product is a surname significance. If it is, and it is only that, then it is primarily merely a surname.” See Ex parte Rivera Watch Corp., 106 USPQ 145, 149 (Comm’r Pat. 1955). Ultimately, the Board stated, “The evidence in this case does not show sufficient public exposure to the uncommon surname BARSKI from which we can conclude that consumers likely would perceive BARSKI as a surname.” Further it found that when the proposed mark was associated with the identified goods, consumers would likely perceive BARSKI as a coined term, and “particularly as a clever bar-related play on the noun ‘brewski’ (a U.S. slang term for ‘beer’), and that this meaning would be the primary perception of BARSKI to the public.” So, the Board reversed the §2(e)(4)  refusal to register the mark BARSKI.

Is MALIBU SUPPER CLUB Geographically Descriptive?

April 20th, 2021

In a 2021 non-precedential case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed a refusal of registration for the mark MALIBU SUPPER CLUB (SUPPER CLUB disclaimed) for restaurant and bar services and found the mark to be geographically descriptive under §2(e)(2).

To establish that a mark is geographically descriptive, the must satisfy three elements: (1) The primary significance of the term in the mark sought to be registered is the name of a place generally known to the public, (2) The services originate in the place named in the mark and (3) The public would make an association between the goods or services and the place named in the mark by believing that the goods or services originate in that place. See In re Newbridge Cutlery Co., 776 F.3d 854, 113 USPQ2d 1445, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, geographic descriptiveness “‘must be evaluated in relation to the particular goods [or services] for which registration is sought, the context in which [the mark] is being used, and the possible significance that the term would have to the average purchaser of the goods [or services] because of the manner of its use or intended use.’” In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., 675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

The Board began its analysis by stating the facts that were set forth in the recorded evidence: (1) The term MALIBU in the applied-for mark is a generally known geographic location, (2) The phrase “supper club” is commonly used by restaurants and bars to identify a type of restaurant, (3) Applicant’s services will originate in Malibu and (4) Relevant consumers will immediately make a connection between the place located in the mark, i.e., Malibu, California, and the services offered by Applicant, namely, restaurant and bar services.

However, the Applicant argued that the term MALIBU would not be seen primarily as a place by consumers, but rather as a common reference to luxury or relaxation. The Applicant’s argument relied on the definition a “[glitzy] area that Hollywood movie stars flock to,” which was taken from a “Pop Culture Dictionary” excerpt from Dictionary.com. The Board negated the argument as the full “Pop Culture Dictionary” passage made it clear that the primary significance of MALIBU was the geographic location, and the passage even began with “Malibu variously refers to a wealthy beach city near Los Angeles….” So, the Board found that consumers would immediately perceive the mark MALIBU SUPPER CLUB, in connection with the Applicants listed services, as designating the location of Applicant’s restaurant.

The Board then looked at the third-party registrations submitted by the Applicant that contained the term MALIBU. It found that the applications were not relevant to the issue at hand as one group of registrations involved goods or services that were unrelated to restaurant or bar services, and the second group of applications contained additional or distinctive wording and the Applicant’s additional wording, SUPPER CLUB, had already been disclaimed. Ultimately the Board stated, “As none of the marks featured in the above-referenced registrations is analogous to the applied-for mark, the third-party registrations submitted by Applicant do not change the result in this case.” See, e.g., In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  

In conclusion, the mark MALIBU SUPPER CLUB satisfied each of the three elements under the §2(e)(2) geographically descriptive test. The mark primary significance of the mark, not including the disclaimed terms, MALIBU SUPPER CLUB is the name of a place generally known to the public, the applied-for services originated in Malibu and as the Board previously stated, relevant consumers will immediately make a connection between the place located in the mark, i.e., Malibu, California, and the services offered by Applicant, namely, restaurant and bar services.  So, in light of the information at hand, the Board affirmed the §2(e)(2) refusal of registration.

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